



I would like to begin with two generally accepted propositions: First,
technological change is a major ingredient of long-term economic growth,
and second, technological change is characterized by a high degree of
uncertainty. Understanding the nature of these uncertainties and the
obstacles to surmounting them is not a trivial matter. Rather, it goes to the
heart of how new technologies are devised, how rapidly they diffuse, the
ultimate extent of that diffusion, and their eventual impact on economic
performance and welfare.
In view of the great uncertainties attached to the innovation process,
it is hardly surprising that innovating firms have, historically, experi-
enced high failure rates. Quite simply, the vast majority of attempts at
innovation fail. But to describe the high failure rate associated with past
innovation is to tell only a part of the story, and perhaps not the most
interesting part. Indeed, I want to suggest that the more intriguing part
of the story, with which I will be mainly concerned, has been the inability
to anticipate the future impact of successful innovations, even after their
technical feasibility has been established. This statement remains valid
whether we focus on the steam engine 200 years ago or on the laser
within our own lifetimes.
I will suggest that uncertainty is the product of several sources and
that it has a number of peculiar characteristics that shape the innovation
process and, therefore, the manner in which technological change exer-
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cises its effects on the economy. Since I will be concerned primarily with
what has shaped the trajectory and the economic impact of new technol-
ogies, my focus will be confined to technologies that have had significant
economic consequences.
I should also say at the outset that, while I am not primarily
concerned with the recent formal literature on growth theory (specifically
The New Growth Theory), I am surprised that that literature has, so far
at least, omitted any mention of uncertainty. While the rate of innovation
is surely a function of the degree to which investors can appropriate the
gains from their innovation, a number of central features of the innova-
tion process revolve around uncertainty. At the very least, when evalu-
ating projects, a risk/return trade-off that reflects the uncertainty attach-
ing to appropriability must be considered. But the kinds of uncertainties
that will be identified here go far beyond the issue of appropriability.
One further caveat seems appropriate. The discussion that follows is
"anecdotal" in nature. However, the anecdotes have been deliberately
selected to include many of the most important innovations of the
twentieth century. Thus, if the characterizations offered below stand the
test of further scrutiny, the analysis of this paper will have captured
distinct features of the innovation process for technologies whose cumu-
lative economic importance has been immense.
It is easy to assume that uncertainties are drastically reduced after
the first commercial introduction of a new technology, and Schumpeter
offered strong encouragement for making that assumption. His views
have proven to be highly influential. In Schumpeter’s world, entrepre-
neurs are compelled to make decisions under circumstances of very
limited and poor quality of information. But in that world, the successful
completion of an innovation resolves all the ex ante uncertainties. Once
invention occurs, the stage is set for imitators, whose actions are
responsible for the diffusion of a technology. Perhaps it should be said
that the stage is now set for "mere imitators," for Schumpeter was fond
of preceding the noun "imitators" with the adjective "mere." The point is
one of real substance, and not just linguistic usage. In Schumpeter’s view,
life is easy for the imitators, because all they need to do is to follow in the
footsteps of the entrepreneurs who have led the way, and whose earlier
activities have resolved all the big uncertainties.
It is, of course, true that some uncertainties have been reduced at that
point. However, after a new technological capability has been estab-
lished, the questions change and, as we will see, new uncertainties,
particularly uncertainties of a specifically economic nature, begin to
assert themselves.
The purpose of this paper is to identify and to delineate a number of
important aspects of uncertainty as they relate to technological change.
These aspects go far beyond those connected with the inventive process
alone. In addition, they reflect a set of interrelated forces that are at theUNCERTAINTY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 93
heart of the relationship between changes in technology and improve-
ments in economic performance.
SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Consider the laser, an innovation that is certainly one of the most
powerful and versatile advances in technology in the twentieth century,
and one that is surely still in the early stages of its trajectory of
development. Its range of uses in the 30 years since it was invented is
truly breathtaking, and would include precision measurement, naviga-
tion, and chemical research. It is also essential for the high-quality
reproduction of music in compact discs (CDs). It has become the
instrument of choice in a range of surgical procedures, including extraor-
dinarily delicate eye surgery, where it is used to repair detached retinas,
and gynecological surgery, where it now provides a simpler and less
painful method for removal of certain tumors. It is extensively employed
in gallbladder surgery. The pages of this manuscript were originally
printed by a laser (Hewlett Packard laser jet printer). It is widely used
throughout industry, including textiles, where it is employed to cut Cloth
to desired shapes, and metallurgy and composite materials, where it
performs similar functions. The opening sentence in an article appearing
in The New York Times in April 1996 stated: "Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory, builder of lasers powerful enough to shoot down missiles or
ignite miniature hydrogen bombs, has created a portable laser that is said
to be able to obliterate graffiti from walls and statues at lightning speed."
But perhaps no single application of the laser has been more
profound than its impact on telecommunications where, together with
fiber optics, it is revolutionizing transmission. The best transatlantic
telephone cable in 1966 could carry simultaneously only 138 conversa-
tions between Europe and North America. The first fiber optic cable,
installed in 1988, could carry 40,000. The fiber optic cables being installed
in the early 1990s can carry nearly 1.5 million conversations (Wriston
1992, pp. 43-44). And yet it is reported that the patent lawyers at Bell
Labs were initially unwilling even to apply for a patent on the laser, on
the grounds that such an invention had no possible relevance to the
telephone industry. In the words of Charles Townes, who subsequently
won a Nobel Prize for his research on the laser, "Bell’s patent department
at first refused to patent our amplifier or oscillator for optical frequencies
because, it was explained, optical waves had never been of any importance
to communications and hence the invention had little bearing on Bell
System interests" (Townes 1968, p. 701).
Let me cite some further major historical instances where the
common theme is the remarkable inability, at least from a later per-
spective, to foresee the uses to which new technologies would soon be
put. Western Union, the telegraph company, was offered the opportunity94 Nathan Rosenberg
to purchase Bell’s 1876 telephone patent for a mere $100,000, but turned
it down. In fact, "Western Union was willing to withdraw from the
telephone field in 1879 in exchange for Bell’s promise to keep out of the
telegraph business." But if the proprietors of the old communications
technology were myopic, so too was the patent holder of the new
technology. Alexander Graham Bell’s 1876 patent did not mention a new
technology at all. Rather, it bore the glaringly misleading title "Improve-
ments in Telegraphy" (Brock 1982, p. 90).
Marconi, who invented the radio, anticipated that it would be used
primarily to communicate between two points where communication by
wire was impossible--as in ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore communication.
(To this day the British call the instrument the "wireless," precisely
reflecting Marconi’s early conceptualization.) Moreover, the radio in its
early days was thought to be of potential use only for private communi-
cation: that is, point-to-point communication, rather like the telephone,
and not at all for communicating to a large audience of listeners.
Surprising as it may seem to us today, the inventor of the radio did not
think of it as an instrument for broadcasting. Marconi, in fact, had a
conception of the market for radio that was the precise opposite of the one
that actually developed. He visualized the users of his invention as
steamship companies, newspapers, and navies that required directional,
point-to-point communication--’narrowcasting" rather than broadcast-
ing. The radio should therefore be capable of transmitting over great
distances, but the messages should be private, not public (Douglas 1987,
p. 34).
The failure of societal imagination was widespread. According
to one authority: "When broadcasting was first proposed ... a man
who was later to become one of the most distinguished leaders of the
industry announced that it was very difficult to see uses for public
broadcasting. About the only regular use he could think of was the
broadcasting of Sunday sermons, because that is the only occasion when
one man regularly addresses a mass public" (Martin 1977, p. 11).
The wireless telephone, when it became feasible in the second decade
of the twentieth century, was thought of in precisely the same terms as
the wireless radio. J.J. Carty, who was chief engineer of the New York
Telephone Company, stated in 1915, "The results of long-distance tests
show clearly that the function of the wireless telephone is primarily to
reach inaccessible places where wires cannot be strung. It will act mainly
as an extension of the wire system and a feeder to it" (Maclaurin 1949, pp.
92-93).
The computer, in 1949, was thought to be of potential use only for
rapid calculation in a few scientific research or data processing contexts.
The notion of a large potential market was rejected by no less a person
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view before 1950 was that world demand probably could be satisfied by
just a few computers (Ceruzzi 1987, pp. 188-93).
The invention of the transistor, certainly one of the greatest inven-
tions of the twentieth century, was not announced on the front page of
The New York Times, as might have been expected, when it was made
public in December 1947. On the contrary, it was a small item buried deep
in the newspaper’s inside pages, in a regular weekly column tiffed "News
of Radio." It was suggested there that the device might be used to
develop better hearing aids for the deaf, but nothing more.
This listing of failures to anticipate future uses and larger markets for
new technologies could be expanded almost without limit. We could, if
we liked, amuse ourselves indefinitely at the failure of earlier generations
to see the obvious, as we see it today. But that would be a mistaken
conceit. For reasons that I propose to examine, I am not particularly
optimistic that our ability to overcome the ex ante uncertainties connected
with the uses of new technologies is likely to improve drastically. If I am
right, a more useful issue to explore is what incentives, institutions,
and policies are more likely to lead to a swifter resolution of these
uncertainties.
Much of the difficulty, I suggest, is connected to the fact that new
technologies typically come into the world in a very primitive condition.
Their eventual uses turn upon an extended improvement process that
vastly expands their practical applications. Thomas Watson, Sr., was not
necessarily far off the mark when he concluded that the future market for
the computer was extremely limited, ff one thinks of the computer in the form
in which it existed immediately after the Second World War. The first electronic
digital computer, the ENIAC, contained no less than 18,000 vacuum tubes
and filled a huge room. (It was more than 100 feet long.) Any device that
has to rely on the simultaneous working of 18,000 vacuum tubes is bound
to be notoriously unreliable. The failure in prediction was a failure to
anticipate the demand for computers after they had been made very
much smaller, cheaper, and more reliable, and when their performance
characteristics, especially their calculating speed, had been improved by
many orders of magnitude. That is to say, the failure was the inability to
anticipate the trajectory of future improvements and the economic con-
sequences of those improvements.
If space permitted, the history of commercial aviation could be
told in similar terms, as could the history of many other innovations.
With respect to the introduction of the jet engine, in particular, the failure
to anticipate the importance of future improvements occurred even at
the most eminent scientific levels. In 1940, a committee of the National
Academy of Sciences was formed to evaluate the prospects for develop-
ing a gas turbine for aircraft. The committee concluded that such a
turbine was quite impractical because it would have to weigh 15 pounds
for each horsepower delivered, whereas existing internal combustion96 Nathan Rosenberg
engines weighed only slightly over one pound for each horsepower
delivered. In fact, within a year the British were operating a gas turbine
that weighed a mere four-tenths of one pound per horsepower (U.S.
Navy, Bureau of Ships 1941, p. 10).
This is an appropriate place at which to make a very simple, but
nonetheless fundamental observation: Most R&D expenditures are de-
voted to product improvement. According to McGraw-Hill annual sur-
veys over a number of years, the great bulk of R&D (around 80 percent)
is devoted to improving products that already exist, rather than to the
invention of new products. Thus, it is incorrect to think of R&D
expenditures as committed to the search for breakthrough innovations of
the Schumpeterian type. On the contrary, the great bulk of these
expenditures need to be thought of as exhibiting strongly path-dependent
characteristics. Their main goal is to improve upon the performance of
technologies that have been inherited from the past.
A moment’s reflection suggests that this should not be surprising.
The telephone has been around for more than a hundred years, but only
recently has its performance been significantly enhanced by facsimile
transmission, electronic mail (e-mail), voice mail, data transfer, on-line
services, mobile phones, conference calls, and "800" numbers. The
automobile and the airplane are each more than 90 years old, the camera
is 150 years old, and the Fourdrinier machine, which is the mainstay of
the papermaking industry today, was patented during the Napoleonic
Wars. Clearly the improvement process deserves far more attention than
is suggested by Schumpeter’s frequent recourse to the derisory term
"mere imitators." Equally clearly, a world in which most R&D expendi-
tures are devoted to improving upon technologies that already exist is
also a world in which technological change can hardly be characterized as
exogenous.
So far it has been suggested, by citing important historical cases,
that uncertainty plays a role in technological change that goes far be-
yond the uncertainty associated with technological feasibility alone.
Indeed, the uncertainty associated with the eventual uses of the laser
or the computer might, more appropriately, be characterized as "igno-
rance" rather than as "uncertainty." That is to say, along any particular
dimension of uncertainty, decisionmakers do not have access to an even
marginally informative probability distribution with respect to potential
outcomes. It is not difficult to demonstrate that ignorance plays a large
part in the process of technological change! However, rather than arguing
over the differences between Arrovian and Knightian uncertainty, the
next section of this paper will outline a number of important dimensions
along which uncertainty plays a role in the rate and.direction of inventive
activity and diffusion. Taken together, we have very little information,
even retrospectively, about the relationships among these different di-
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decisionmaker does not have information about the joint distribution of
all the relevant random variables, then we have little reason to believe
that a "rational" decision is possible or that a well-defined "optimal"
investment or adoption strategy will be found.
THE DIMENSIONS OF UNCERTAINTY
Why is it so difficult to foresee the impact of even technologically
practicable inventions? Much of the relevant literature emphasizes the
huge uncertainty associated with the question: "Will it work?" This is
clearly a major source of uncertainty, but the fixation upon workability
has served to distract attention from several other, more subtle and
overlapping sources. We turn now to a consideration of these sources.
Ex Ante Uncertainty about Improvements and Uses
It is not only that new technologies come into the world in a very
primitive condition; they often do so with properties and characteristics
whose usefulness cannot be immediately appreciated. It is inherently
difficult to identify uses for new technologies. The laser (Light Amplifi-
cation by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) represents, at one level,
simply a light beam formed by the excitation of atoms at high energy
levels. It has turned out that laser action can occur with a wide range of
materials, including gases, liquids, and solids. The uses to which this
capability has been put have been growing for 30 years, as suggested
earlier, and will doubtless continue to grow for a long time, just as it took
many decades to explore the uses to which electricity could be put after
Faraday discovered the principles of electromagnetic induction in 1831.1
An essential aspect was that neither the laser nor electricity repre-
sented an obvious substitute for anything that already existed. Neither
had a clearly defined antecedent. Rather, each technology was a newly
discovered phenomenon that was the outcome of pure scientific re-
search.2
In the field of medical diagnostics it has frequently happened that,
after some new visualization technology has been developed, it has taken
1 It is recorded that a skeptical MP turned up at Faraday’s laboratory shortly after his
discovery of electromagnetic induction and asked him in a rather supercilious tone what it
was good for. Faraday is supposed to have replied: "Sir, I do not know what it is good for.
But of one thing I am quite certain: someday you will tax it."
2 In fact, Einstein had already worked out the pure science underlying laser action in
1916, in a paper on stimulated emission. From the point of view of the history of science, it
might be said that there was "nothing new" when laser technology was developed some 45
years later, although a Nobel Prize was awarded for the achievement. From the point of
view of technological change and its economic and social impact, the development of the
laser was of course a major event.98 Nathan Rosenberg
a long time to learn how to translate the new observational capability into
clinically useful terms. This has been the case with respect to CAT
scanners, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and most recently echocar-
diography. Often a great deal of time-consuming additional research has
been required before it was possible to make a reliable, clinically helpful
interpretation of what was already being visualized in terms of the
diagnosis of a disease condition in the heart, lungs, or brain.
This is presently the case with respect to PET--positron emission
tomographyo PET scanners are powerful tools for providing a quantita-
tive analysis of certain physiological functions, unlike CAT and MRI,
which are valuable for anatomical observation. Thus, it has great poten-
tial for providing useful information on the effectiveness, for example, of
drug therapy for the treatment of various diseases, such as brain tumors.
But, quite aside from the huge cost of this technology, its clinical
application in such fields as neurology, cardiology, and oncology has so
far been limited by the continuing difficulties of translating observations
and measurements of physiological functions into specific, meaningful
clinical interpretations.
A related point can be made in the currently burgeoning field of
medical innovation. The inherent complexity of the human body and,
perhaps equally important, the heterogeneity of human bodies, have
rendered it extremely difficult to tease out cause-effect relationships,
even in the case of medications that have been widely used for long
periods of time. Aspirin (acetylsalicylic acid), probably the world’s most
widely used drug, has been in use for very nearly a century, but only
in the last couple of years has its efficacy been established for reducing
the incidence of heart attacks as a consequence of its blood-thinning
properties.
Although the discovery of negative side effects has received far more
public attention, the discovery of unexpected beneficial new uses for old
pharmaceutical products is a common, and often serendipitous, experi-
ence. Another significant case in point has been the applications of
andrenergic beta-blocking drugs, one of the more significant medical
innovations of our time. These compounds were ’originally introduced for
the treatment of two cardiovascular indications, arrythmias and angina
pectoris. Today they are used in the treatment of more than 20 diverse
conditions, largely as a result of new uses that were uncovered after they
had been introduced into cardiology. These include such noncardiac
indications as gastrointestinal bleeding, hypertension, and alcoholism
(Gelijns 1991, pp. 121 and 269). Similar experiences could be related with
respect to AZT (currently employed in the treatment of AIDS patients),
oral contraceptives, RU-486, streptokinase, alpha interferon, and Prozac.
More generally, the widespread "off-label" uses of many drugs provide a
good indication of the pervasiveness of ex ante uncertainty in medical
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The Need for Complementary Technologies
Second, the impact of an innovation depends not only on improve-
ments of the invention, but also upon improvements that take place
in complementary inventions. For the lawyers at Bell Labs to have
had some appreciation of the laser’s importance for telephone commu-
nication, they would have required some sense of fiber optic technology
and the ways in which the two--lasers and fiber optics--might
be combined. The laser was of no particular use in telephone transmission
without the availability of fiber optics. Telephone transmission is being
transformed today by the combined potential of these two technologies.
Optical fiber did in fact exist in its own rather primitive form in the early
1960s, when the first lasers were developed, but not in a form that could
accommodate the requirements of telephone transmission. In fact, it is
interesting to note that an excellent book on the telecommunications
industry, published as recently as 1981, provides no discussion whatso-
ever of this new fiber optic technology (Brock 1982). As is often the case,
it took a number of years for some of the attractive properties of fiber
optics technology to become apparent: the lack of electromagnetic inter-
ference, the conservation of heat and electricity, and the enormous
expansion in bandwidth that fiber optics can provide--the last feature a
consequence of the fact that the light spectrum is approximately 1,000
times wider than the radio spectrum.
The general point is that the impact of invention A will often depend
upon invention B, and invention B may not yet exist. But perhaps a
more useful formulation is to say that inventions will often give rise to a
search for complementary inventions. An important impact of invention
A is to increase the demand for invention B. The declining price of
electricity, after the introduction of the dynamo in the early 1880s,
stimulated the search for technologies that could exploit this unique
form of energy. But the time frame over which such complementary
innovations could be developed turned out to vary considerably. The
search gave rise almost instantly to a burgeoning electrochemical indus-
try, employing electrolytic techniques (aluminum), but a much longer
period of time was required before the development of the complemen-
tary electric motor that was to become ubiquitous in the twentieth
century.
Similarly, a main reason for the modest future prospects that were
being predicted for the computer in the late 1940s was that transistors
had not yet been incorporated into the computers of the day. The
introductions of the transistor, and later integrated circuits, into comput-
ers were, of course, momentous events that transformed the computer
industry. Indeed, in one of the most remarkable technological achieve-
ments of the twentieth century, the integrated circuit eventually became
a computer with the advent of the microprocessor in 1970. The world100 Nathan Rosenberg
would be a far different place today if computers were still made using
vacuum tubes.
The need to develop complementary technologies may have had a
great deal to do in the last couple of decades with the apparent failure of
computer technology to raise the level of productivity growth in the
United States above its recent rather dismal levels. Robert Solow has
made the observation that we see computers everywhere today except
in the productivity statistics. But it appears to be typical of truly major
innovations that they take a long time to absorb. The historical experience
with respect to the introduction of electricity offers many earlier parallels.
If we date the beginning of the electric age in the early 1880s (dynamos),
it was fully 40 years--into the 1920s--before the electrification of fac-
tories began to show up in terms of significant measured productivity
growth (Du Boff 1967; Devine 1983; Schurr 1990).
Major new technological regimes take many years before they
replace an established technology. Partly the delay is due to having to
develop numerous components of a larger technological system, an issue
that will be addressed shortly. Restructuring a factory around an electric
power source, in place of the earlier steam engine or water power,
commonly required a complete redesign and restructuring of a factory
facility. It represented, among other things, a revolution in the principles
of factory organization. The layout of the machinery, in the factory now
had far more flexibility than it did with the old power sources. Learning
how best to exploit a new, highly versatile power source with entirely
different methods of power transmission inside the plant involved
decades of experimentation and learning. Indeed, such technological
innovations commonly require significant organizational changes as well.
(The glacial pace at which organizational changes often take place may have
a great deal to do with Solow’s complaint about the failure of computers
to be reflected in the productivity statistics.)
Moreover, firms that had huge investments in manufacturing plants,
with long productive lives still ahead of them, naturally were reluctant to
discard a facility that was still perfectly usable. As a result, if we ask who
the early adopters of electricity were in the first ~0 years of the twentieth
century, it turns out that they were mainly new industries that were
setting up production facilities for the first time; that is, producers of
"tobacco, fabricated metals, transportation equipment and electrical
machinery itself." In the older, established industries, the introduction of
electric power had to await the "physical depreciation of durable factory
structures," and the "obsolescence of older-vintage industrial plants sited
in urban core areas" (David 1990, p. 357).
The general point is that a radical new technology such as a
computer must necessarily have a very long gestation period before
its characteristics and opportunities are well understood and can be
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electric power. But 20 years later the figure had risen to 75 percent.
History suggests that we should not be terribly surprised. Yet if we date
the beginning of the modern computer--a much more complex general
purpose technology than electricity--from the invention of the micropro-
cessor in 1970, we are still only a quarter century into the computer age.
It took some 40 years or so before electric power came to play a
dominating role in manufacturing. History strongly suggests that tech-
nological revolutions are never completed overnight. If this is correct, it
should be a source of optimism. The great economic benefits of the
computer may still lie before us!
Innovations as Components of a Technological System
As a closely connected point, major technological innovations often
constitute entirely new technological systems. But it is difficult in the
extreme to conceptualize an entirely new system. Thus, thinking about
new technologies is likely to be severely handicapped by the tendency to
view them in terms of the old technologies that they eventually replace.
Time and again, contemporaries of a new technology are found to have
thought about it as a mere supplement that would offset certain inherent
limitations of an existing technology. In the 1830s and 1840s, railroads
were thought of merely as feeders into the existing canal system, to be
constructed in places where the terrain had rendered canals inherently
impractical (Fogel 1964). This is precisely the same difficulty that later
was encountered by the radio. Similarly, the telephone was originally
conceptualized as primarily a business instrument, like the telegraph, to
be used to exchange very specific messages, such as the terms of a
prospective contractual agreement. This may of course explain why Bell’s
telephone patent was, as mentioned earlier, titled "Improvements in
Telegraphy."
It is characteristic of a system that performance improvements in one
part are of only limited significance without simultaneous improvements
in other parts. In this sense, technological systems may be thought of as
comprising clusters of complementary inventions. Improvements in
power generation can have only a limited impact on the delivered cost of
electricity until improvements are made in the transmission network and
the cost of transporting electricity over long distances. This need for
further innovation in complementary activities is an important reason
why even apparently spectacular breakthroughs usually have only a
slowly rising productivity curve flowing from them. Within technological
systems, therefore, major improvements in productivity seldom flow
from single technological innovations, however significant they may
appear to be. At the same time, the cumulative effects of large numbers of
improvements within a technological system eventually may be im-
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Unanticipated Applications
An additional and historically very important reason why it has been
so difficult to foresee the uses of a new technology is that many major
inventions had their origins in the attempt to solve very specific and often
very narrowly defined problems. However, it is common that once a
solution has been found, it turns out to have significant applications in
totally unanticipated contexts. That is to say, much of the impact of new
technologies is realized through intersectoral flows. Inventions have very
serendipitous life histories (Rosenberg 1976a).
The steam engine, for example, was invented in the eighteenth
century specifically as a device for pumping water out of flooded mines.
In fact it was, for a long time, regarded exclusively as a pump. A
succession of improvements later rendered it a feasible source of power
for textile factories, iron mills, and an expanding array of industrial
establishments. In the course of the early nineteenth century, the steam
engine became a generalizable source of power and had major applica-
tions in transportation--railroads, steamships, and steamboats. In fact,
before the Civil War, the main use of the steam engine in the United
States was not in manufacturing but in transportation. Later in the
nineteenth century the steam engine was, for a time, used to produce a
new and even more generalizable source of power--electricity--which in
turn satisfied innumerable final uses to which steam power itself was not
directly applicable. Finally~ the steam turbine displaced the steam engine
in the generation of electric power, and the special features of electricity--
its ease of transmission over long distances, the capacity for making
power available in "fractionalized" units, and the far greater flexibility of
electricity-powered equipment--sounded the eventual death knell of the
steam engine itself.
Major innovations such as the steam engine, once they have been
established, have the effect of inducing further innovations and invest-
ments over a wide frontier. Indeed, the ability to induce such further
innovations and investments is a reasonably good definition of what
constitutes a major innovation. It is a useful way of distinguishing
between technological advances that are merely invested with great
novelty from advances that have the potential for a major economic
impact. But this also highlights the difficulties in foreseeing the eventual
impact, since that will depend on the size and the direction of these future
complementary innovations and associated investments.
The life history of the steam engine was shaped by forces that could
hardly have been foreseen by British inventors who were working on
ways of removing water from increasingly flooded coal mines in the
eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the very existence of the steam engine,
once its operating principles had been thoroughly understood, served as
a powerful stimulus to other inventions.UNCERTAINTY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 103
Impacts on Other Industries
I have been stressing here that innovations often arise as solutions to
highly specific problems in a particular industry, and that their subse-
quent interindustry flow is bound to be highly uncertain. This is because
the uses of a new technology in a quite different industrial context are
especially difficult to anticipate. Moreover, in some cases a new tech-
nological capability may have multiple points of impact on another
industry.
Consider the impact of the computer upon the air transportation
industry. I would suggest that the changing performance of commercial
air transportation has been at least as much influenced by the application
of the computer to new uses in this industry as by the R&D spending that
has taken place within air transportation itself.
Supercomputers now perform a good deal of fundamental aero-
dynamic research, including much--but not all--of the research
that was formerly performed in wind tunnels.
Computers have been a major source of cost reduction in the
design of specific components of the aircraft, such as the wing.
They played an important role in the wing designs of the Boeing
747, 757, and 767, as well as the Airbus 310.
Computers are now responsible for much of the activity that takes
place in the cockpit, including of course the automatic pilot.
Computers, together with weather satellites, which routinely de-
termine the shifting location of high-altitude jet streams, are now
widely used in determining optimal flight paths. The fuel savings
for the world commercial airline industry is probably well in
excess of $1 billion per year. (Note that this is yet another
important case of the economic impact of a technology, the com-
puter, depending upon a complementary technology that was only
developed many years later, weather satellites.)
Computers and computer networks are at the heart of the present
worldwide ticketing and seating reservation system.
Computer simulation is now the preferred method of instruction
in teaching neophytes how to fly.
The computer, together with radar, has become absolutely central
to the operation of the air traffic control system, which would be
difficult to conceive without it.
One important implication of this discussion is that R&D spend-
ing tends to be highly concentrated in a small number of industries.
However, each of these few industries needs to be regarded as a locus of
research activity that generates new technologies that may be widely
diffused throughout the entire economy. Historically, a small number of
industries have played this role in especially crucial ways: steam engines,104 Nathan Rosenberg
electricity, machine tools, computers, transistors, and so on. This rein-
forces the earlier suggestion that we may even d~’ne a major--or
breakthrough--innovation as one that establishes a new framework for
the working out of incremental innovations. In this sense, incremental
innovations are the natural complements of breakthrough innovations.
Breakthrough innovations, in turn, have often provided the basis for the
emergence of entirely new industries.
The Identification of Needs
The final constraint is rather less precise than the rest but, I believe,
it is no less important. That is, the ultimate impact of some new
technological capability is not just a matter of technical feasibility or
improved technical performance; rather, it is a matter of identifying
certain specific categories of human needs and catering to them in novel
or cost-effective ways. New technologies need to pass an economic test,
not just a technological one. Thus, the Concorde is a spectacular success
in terms of flight performance, but it has proved to be a financial disaster,
costing British and French taxpayers the equivalent of several billions of
dollars.
Ultimately, what is often needed is not just technical expertise but the
exercise of imagination. Understanding the technical basis for wireless
communication, which Marconi did, was a very different matter from
anticipating how the device might be used to enlarge the human
experience. Marconi had no sense of this. On the other hand, an
uneducated Russian immigrant, David Sarnoff, had a lively vision of how
the new technol6gy might be used to transmit news, music, and other
forms of entertainment and information into every household (and
eventually automobile) in the country. Sarnoff, in brief, appreciated the
commercial possibilities of the new technology. Sarnoff’s vision eventu-
ally prevailed, under his leadership of RCA after the First World War
(Bilby 1985).
Similarly, Howard Aiken, a Harvard phys~cs instructor who was a
great pioneer in the early development of the computer, continued to
think of it in the narrow context in which its early development took
place--that is, purely as a device for solving esoteric scientific problems.
As late as 1956 he stated: "if it should ever turn out that the basic logics
of a machine designed for the numerical solution of differential equations
coincide with the logics of a machine intended to make bills for a
department store, I would regard this as the most amazing coincidence
that I have ever encountered" (Ceruzzi 1987, p. 197). That is, of course,
precisely how it turned out, but it was hardly a coincidence. A technology
originally invented for one specific purpose--the numerical solution of
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problems in entirely different contexts, such as department store billing
procedures. But it obviously was not obvious!
The essential point, of course, is that social change or economic
impact is not something that can be extrapolated out of a piece of
hardware. New technologies, rather, need to be conceived of as building
blocks. Their eventual impact will depend on what is subsequently
designed and constructed with them. New technologies are unrealized
potentials that may take a very large number of eventual shapes. What
shapes they actually take will depend on the ability to visualize how they
might be employed in new contexts. Sony’s development of the Walkman
is a brilliant example of how an existing technological capability, involv-
ing batteries, magnetic tapes, and earphones, could be recombined to
create an entirely new product that could provide entertainment in
contexts where it previously could not be delivered--where, indeed, no
one had even thought of delivering it--for example, to walkers or even
joggers. To be sure, the product required a great deal of engineering
redesign of existing components, but the real breakthrough was the
identification, by Akio Morita, of a market opportunity that previously
had not been identified.
Although many Americans continue to believe that the VCR was an
American invention, that is simply an unsupportable perception. The
American pioneers in this field, RCA and Ampex, gave up long before a
truly usable product had been developed. Matsushita and Sony, on the
other hand, made thousands of small improvements in design and
manufacturing after the American firms had essentially left the field.
These developments were closely connected to another point. A crucial
step forward in the development of the VCR was the realization that a
potential mass market existed in households if certain performance
characteristics, especially the product’s storage capacity, could be suffi-
ciently expanded. Although the initial American conception of the VCR
had been of a capital good to be used by television stations, some
American as well as Japanese developers were aware of the much larger
home market possibilities. The crucial difference seems to have been the
Japanese confidence, based upon their own manufacturing experience,
that they could achieve the necessary cost reductions and performance
improvements. The rapid transformation of the VCR into one of Japan’s
largest export products was therefore an achievement of both imagina-
tion and justified confidence in their engineering capabilities (Rosen-
bloom and Cusumano 1987).
The limited view once held by Americans of the potential for the
VCR bears some parallels with the disdain of the mainframe computer
makers toward the personal computer as it began to emerge about 15
years ago. It was then fashionable to dismiss the PC as a mere "hacker’s
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serious threat to the economic future of mainframes (The New York Times
1994).
REVIVING OLD TECHNOLOGIES, OR KILLING THEM OFF?
My analysis has focused upon barriers to the exploitation of new
technologies. But in highly competitive societies with strong incentives to
innovation, those incentives apply to improving old technologies as well
as to inventing new ones. In fact, innovations often appear to induce
vigorous and imaginative responses on the part of firms that find
themselves confronted with close substitutes for their traditional prod-
ucts. It is not at all uncommon to find that the competitive pressure
resulting from a new technology leads to an accelerated improvement in
the old technology. Some of the greatest improvements in wooden sailing
ships took place between 1850 and 1880, just after the introduction of the
iron hull steamship and the compound steam engines that were to
displace sailing ships by the beginning of the twentieth century. These
innovations included drastic improvements in hull design that allowed
greater speed, more cargo in proportion to the tonnage of the ship and,
above all, the introduction of labor-saving machinery that reduced crew
requirements by no less than two-thirds. Similarly, the greatest improve-
ments in gas lamps used for interior lighting occurred shortly after the
introduction of the incandescent electric light bulb (Rosenberg 1976b).
More recently, soon after the introduction of coronary angioplasty, a
potential substitute for coronary bypass surgery, substantial improve-
ments were made in the "old" surgical procedure. In each case, of course,
the timing may have been coincidental.
A major feature of the postwar telecommunications industry is that
research has increased the capabilities of the already installed transmis-
sion system, in addition to leading to the development of new and more
productive technologies. Every major transmission system--a pair of
wires, coaxial cables, microwaves, satellites, fiber optics--has been sub-
ject to extensive later improvements in message-carrying capabilities,
often with only relatively minor modification of the existing transmission
technology. In some cases, order-of-magnitude increases have occurred
in the message-carrying capability of an existing channel, such as a 3/8th
inch coaxial cable, and such productivity improvements have frequently
led to the postponement of the introduction of new generations of
transmission technologies. For example, time-division multiplexing al-
lowed an existing pair of wires to carry 24 voice channels or more, rather
than the single channel that it originally carried. The same pattern is
observed in fiber optics technology. When AT&T began field trials with
fiber optics in the mid 1970s, information was transmitted at 45 mega-
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reached 565 megabytes per second, with reliable sources predicting
capacities of nearly 1,000 megabytes per second in the near future.
But it is not only the case that the introduction of new technologies
often has to await the availability of complementary technologies and
that, in the meantime, established technologies may achieve renewed
competitive vigor through continual improvements. New technologies
may also turn out to be substitutes rather than complements for existing
ones, thus drastically shortening the life expectancy of technologies that
once seemed to warrant distinctly bullish expectations. The future
prospects for communication satellites declined quite unexpectedly dur-
ing the 1980s with the introduction of fiber optics and the huge and
reliable expansion of channel capacity that they brought with them. In
turn, fiber optics, whose first significant application was in medical
diagnostics in the early 1960s, may now be approaching the beginning of
the end of its useful life. Fiber optic endoscopes had made possible a huge
improvement in minimally invasive techniques for visualizing the gas-
trointestinal tract. Recently, new sensors from the realm of electronics,
charged couple devices (CCDs), have begun to provide images with a
resolution and degree of detail that could not possibly be provided by
fiber optic devices. The CT scanner, certainly one of the great diagnostic
breakthroughs of the twentieth century, is giving way to an even more
powerful diagnostic capability--MRI. Uncertainties of this sort impart a
large element of risk to long-term investments in expensive new technol-
ogies. The competitive process that eventually resolves these uncertain-
ties is not the traditional textbook competition among producers of a
homogeneous product, each seeking to deliver the same product to
market at a lower cost. Rather, it is a competition among different
technologies, a process that Schumpeter appropriately described as
"creative destruction." Thus, it is no paradox to say that one of the
greatest uncertainties confronting new technologies is the invention of yet
newer ones.
The simultaneous advance in new technology, along with the sub-
stantial upgrading of old technology, underlines the pervasive uncer-
tainty confronting industrial decisionmakers in a world of rapid techno-
logical change. One would have to be very optimistic, as well as naive, to
think that some intellectual paradigm can be developed to handle all the
relevant variables in some neat and systematic way. But it may be
plausible to believe that a more rigorous analysis of the issues raised here
may lead to considerable improvement in the way we think about the
innovation process.
We can now return to the initial point: The lack of knowledge about
the relationships between these different dimensions of uncertainty
precludes us from understanding the total effect of uncertainty upon
technological change. For example, two dimensions of uncertainty,
discussed above, concern the refinement of complementary technologies108 Nathan Rosenberg
and the potential for any technology to form the core of a new techno-
logical system. Even at the simplest level, it is difficult to be precise about
the interaction between these different effects. The existence and refine-
ment of complementary technologies may exercise a coercive and con-
servative effect, forcing the novel technology to be placed inside the
current "system." Alternatively, however, complementary technologies
may be exactly what is necessary for the practical realization of an
entirely new system. My point is not to decide one way or the other on
these issues; instead, it is to argue that a research program that neglects
these interactions may be missing a very large part of how uncertainty
has shaped the rate and direction of technological change and, by
extension, the historical growth experience.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It is not part of my warrant to offer any policy recommendations.
However, a few closing observations may be in order. The research
community is currently being exhorted with increasing force to unfurl the
flag of "relevance" to social and economic needs. The burden of much
that has been said here is that frequently we simply do not know what
new findings may turn out to be relevant, or to what particular realm of
human activity that relevance may eventually apply. Indeed, I have been
staking the broad claim that a pervasive uncertainty characterizes not
only basic research, where it is generally acknowledged, but the realm of
product design and new product development as well--the D of R&D.
Consequently, early precommitment to any specific, large-scale technol-
ogy project, as opposed to a more limited, sequential decision-making
approach, is likely to be hazardous--that is, wasteful. Evidence for this
assertion abounds in such government-sponsored projects as weapons
procurement, the space program, research on the development of an
artificial heart, and synthetic fuels.
The pervasiveness of uncertainty suggests that the government
ordinarily should resist the temptation to play the role of a champion
of any one technological alternative, such as nuclear power, or any
narrowly concentrated focus of research support, such as the "War on
Cancer." Rather, it would seem to make a great deal of sense to manage
a deliberately diversified research portfolio, a portfolio that is likely to
illuminate a range of alternatives in the event of a reordering of social
or economic priorities or the unexpected failure of any single, major
research thrust. Government policy ought to open many windows and
provide the private sector with financial incentives to explore the
technological landscape that can only be faintly discerned from those
windows. Thus, my criticism of the federal government’s postwar energy
policy is not that it made a major commitment to nuclear power that
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criticism is aimed at the single-mindedness of the focus on nuclear power
that led to a comparative neglect of many other alternatives, including
not only alternative energy sources but improvements in the efficiency of
energy utilization.
The situation with respect to the private sector is obviously different.
Private firms may normally be expected to allocate their R&D funds in
ways that they hope will turn out to be relevant. Private firms are very
much aware that they confront huge uncertainties in the marketplace,
and they are capable of making their own assessments and placing their
"bets" accordingly. Bad bets are, of course, common, indeed so common
that it is tempting to conclude that the manner in which competing firms
pursue innovation is a very wasteful process. Such a characterization
would be appropriate were it not for a single point: uncertainty. In fact,
a considerable virtue of the marketplace is that, in the face of huge ex ante
uncertainties concerning the uses of new technological capabilities, it
encourages exploration along a wide variety of alternative paths. This is
especially desirable in the early stages, when uncertainties are particu-
larly high and when individuals with differences of opinion (often based
upon differences in access to information) need to be encouraged to
pursue their own hunches or intuitions. Indeed, it is important that this
point be stated more affirmatively: The achievement of technological
progress, in the face of numerous uncertainties, requires such ex ante
differences of opinion.
Finally, a further considerable virtue of the marketplace is that it also
provides strong incentives to terminate, quickly and unsentimentally,
directions of research whose once rosy prospects have been unexpectedly
dimmed by the availability of new data, by some change in the economic
environment, or by a restructuring of social or political priorities. For a
country that currently supports more than 700 federal laboratories with
a total annual budget of over $23 billion, more than half of which is
devoted to weapons development or other defense-related purposes, that
is no small virtue.
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Joel Mokyr*
Anyone can have fun collecting technological predictions that did
not materialize. Time and again, learned scientists and skilled engineers
have been caught predicting with Lord Kelvin that most things that
can be invented already have been and that diminishing returns to
innovation have set in. Inventions that we know now to have been of
momentous importance were more often than not thought to be minor
curiosa.1 Nathan Rosenberg, in his stimulating and entertaining paper,
thinks that in part it is a "failure of social imagination" that accounts
for these erroneous predictions. I am not sure what a social imagination
is, but clearly some writers, from Roger Bacon to Jules Verne to more
contemporary science fiction writers, did not suffer from a lack of
imagination. It is just that the worlds they imagined and the worlds that
eventually materialized subsequently overlap very little.
If there is one technology that preoccupies and fascinates our current
world, it must be decentralized information and communication. That
was not what most people who imagined at all half a century ago
foresaw. They believed that by this time space travel would be com-
mon-it is not. Many of them feared total control by a central government
that had access to incredible technologies allowing them to manipulate
people beyond anyone’s wildest nightmares. Such totalitarianism has not
come about. Kurt Vonnegut’s nightmarish world in Player Piano, in which
labor-saving technological change has made labor redundant, has not
*Robert H. Strotz Professor of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Economics and
History, Northwestern University.
1 One of the more entertaining examples was The New York Times prediction in 1939 that
"Television will never be a serious competitor for radio, because people must sit and keep
their eyes glued on a screen; the average American family hasn’t time for it." Cited in The
Economist, July 5th, 1996, p. 15.112 Joel Mokyr
arrived. In fact, we seem to be working harder than ever before, if Juliet
Schor is to be believed. It is not, I submit, lack of imagination, but the
simple fact that imagination had it mostly wrong. We are today the future
of the 1950s, but--with some exceptions--we are not what futurologists
of that time thought we were going to be. The Talmud had it right when
it sighed that "since our second temple was destroyed, the art of
prophesy was given to the fools."
Rosenberg distinguishes in his paper between "uncertainty" and
"ignorance." Decision-makers do not have access to an even marginally
informative probability distribution, he says, so ignorance is perhaps a
more suitable concept than uncertainty. The uncertainty of technological
change is one that society cannot hedge against and cannot diversify
away (although, of course, individual firms engaged in R&D can). The
question is why technological change is so difficult to predict and so
difficult to understand, and Rosenberg gives some very good answers.
M~ own answers may seem on the surface different from his, but at
second glance will turn out to be more or less a reformulation rather than
an alternative.
To start off, technological change involves two levels of uncertainty.
One is the firm’s microproblem: Will a particular line of research pay off?
That question can be decomposed into a whole host of subquestions that
compound each other: Can this technical problem be solved at all? Can we
solve it? Can we do so before anyone else does? Will it sell, and at what
price? The other level is the economy’s macroproblem: What kind of
technological regime will emerge as dominant? Will it be using digital or
analog computers? Western antibiotics or Chinese herbal treatments?
Fixed-wing aircraft or dirigibles? Nuclear or fossil fuels? Boiled potatoes
or oatmeal porridge? This is the kind of uncertainty that historians have
to deal with when they wish to explain why a society’s production
techniques developed in one direction but not another, but it is also
hugely relevant for decision-makers at the micro level.
MUTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION
The lack of predictability is not the curse of the economics of
technologicalchange alone. Evolutionary biology, too, is incapable of
making accurate predictions.2 Instead, biologists depend largely on the
paleontologists and their fossil bones to tell them about the facts of
evolution. No biologist has ever witnessed a speciation event. We know
that speciation occurred, of course, from our past record, but speciation
cannot be predicted, or even recognized when we see it. The concept only
makes sense in view of the past. The reason why biologists cannot predict
2 For more details on this analogy, see Mokyr (1991 and 1996).DISCUSSION 113
is fairly obvious: Mutations occur at random. The raw materials from
which natural selection has to choose have no systematic component.
Direction is imparted to the system exclusively by the selection process,
an ex post mechanism. Moreover, the selection mechanism picks new life
forms by well-defined criteria, yet we rarely understand these criteria
sufficiently beyond saying that they increase fitness, a rather circular
argument.
Indeed, it is now well understood that many seemingly favorable
mutations will disappear, for a variety of reasons. To be picked, a
mutation may have to increase fitness, but the reverse clearly does not
hold. In any case, we are a long shot away from making conditional
predictions on what will happen. This does not mean we know nothing at
all: We can make negative conditional predictions such as "If an insect
weighing 300 pounds emerges by some implausible mutation, it will not
survive." But narrowing the bands of the possible does not amount to
prediction. The uncertainty thus comes in twice: We do not know what
the supply of i~movations will look like, nor do we know with certainty
which ones will be picked for retention.
What does all this have to do with technological change? Social and
cultural processes have increasingly been thought of in evolutionary
terms (Campbell 1960; Cavalli-Sforza 1986). That is not to say that they
resemble in all their details the mechanism we now think of as the
neo-Darwinian orthodoxy in evolutionary biology. In the living world,
because mutations occur as a result of random processes and are
orthogonal to the "needs" of the organism, they are far more than likely
to be either detrimental or neutral. Only in the rarest of cases will a
mutation turn out to increase fitness. In other evolutionary processes, that
is not necessarily so. Moreover, in biological evolution, parentage is either
single- or biparental. In cultural and social processes, the analog of
genomes can be acquired from many sources. Acquired characteristics
are retained and passed on to other generations. And so on--the
differences are quite substantial. All the same, many of us find it useful to
think of technological change as an evolutionary process. Innovations
occur and are passed through selective filters. Whether natural or not, the
idea of selection, in one philosopher’s catchy phrase, "Darwin’s dangerous
idea," is often thought to be central in explaining why things are what
they are (Dennett 1995).
While cultural evolution (of which technological evolution is a
special case) thus differs from what Darwinian dogma holds for biology,
the idea of directed selection imposed upon an exogenous and stochastic
supply of innovations seems to be a powerful notion. Predictability
depends on the correlation between need and mutation. Rosenberg
implies that while such a correlation may not be zero, it is not very high
either. "Necessity" is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for an
innovation to emerge. Needs remain unsatisfied despite frantic scram-114 Joel Mokyr
bling for a technological fix; at other times, as in the case of the Walkman
cited by Rosenberg, the need may have emerged after the invention
became feasible or turned out to be quite different than originally
intended. What he is looking at is something that biologists have called
"exaptation" following a term proposed by Gould and Vrba (1982): A
trait may arise resulting from one set of selective pressures and then end
up being used in an entirely different capacity.
Predicting the supply of innovation is thus an extremely risky
venture. To make things worse, as noted, the selective filters are only very
imperfectly understood. Why do some inventions succeed and others
fail? It would be nice if we had a one-to-one mapping of "fit-
ness" defined in some way (say, firm profitability) to the adoption of
inventions. But we know better: Complementarities, frequency depen-
dency, the fortuitous presence or absence of a crucial factor, the energy
and single-mindedness of one individual (as in the case of Admiral
Hyman Rickover and the heavy-water nuclear reactor), and other factors
mean that contingency and luck will continue to play a role. Seventy
percent of all new products that get through the first layer of filters and
actually make it to the supermarket shelves disappear again in their first
12 months. If prediction were easy, such errors would not occur.
In short, then, two sources of uncertainty compound each other
in technological history: one concerns which novelties emerged at all, the
other which novelties that somehow emerged made it to the marketplace
and survived. To repeat, this does not mean that we are totally ignorant,
but that by and large the techniques that we end up using were not
inevitable. Many artifacts and techniques actually in use are no more
inexorable than the peacock or the platypus. Technological history, very
much like natural history, is ridden by what we may call bounded
contingency. The history of science is similarly the result of blind variation
and selective retention, as a long series of distinguished historians of
science from Donald Campbell to David Hull have been arguing. Some
scientific advances are of course obvious, given what precedes them. The
more we learn about how science developed, however, the more we start
to understand how Kuhn’s great paradigms often evolved as the result of
polit!cal power plays and a directionality imparted upon science by the
ways scientists made a living, not their internal logic. Science, in short, is
no more predictable than technology.
The third leg of our triad of evolutionary processes is the changes in
economic institutions. Douglass North, the guru of institutional analysis,
has long called upon us to propose an evolutionary theory of institutions
(North 1990). None has emerged so far. Perhaps this is because, unlike
other cultural systems such as science and language, the intuition of what
an innovation is, is less clearly defined. To be sure, institutional innova-
tions, such as the emergence of modern stock markets, indentured
servitude, or fee simple, have occurred, but institutional change seems toDISCUSSION 115
be less about innovation and selection than about adaptation and the
emergence of certain conventions and coalitions that have a vague
interpretation of Nash equilibria. All the same, it is faff to say that
whatever process one envisages here, it would be foolhardy to construct
models that predict what institutions are going to emerge in the future.
Even if we could somehow specify the "demand" side, we do not always
get the institutions we need and surely do not always need the institu-
tions we have. Here too, history dictates what we can and cannot do.
Present institutions are a Markov chain: the sum of all past changes plus
an epsilono Of course, sudden innovation is possible, and societies at
times overthrow their institutional structure and pick another--but their
choice is usually limited to what others have done before. Only a few
times in history did a few societies have a true revolution (in that they set
up a new set of institutions not previously tried by anyone else), usually
with disastrous results.
THE COEVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGYt
SCIENCEt AND ~NSTITUTIONS
Now that we have depicted history as these three evolutionary and
unpredictable processes moving side by side, we can add another layer to
Rosenberg’s questions about predictability. The point is that technology,
science, and institutions do not only evolve, they co-evolve. The path that
technology can take is not only conditioned by its own past, its luck, and
its selection mechanism, it is also conditioned by the unpredictable path
of science and institutions. What is more, its evolution feeds back into the
evolution of the other two. Such feedback could be positive, negative, or
a mixture of the two. Many volumes have been written about how science
and technology interact, and Rosenberg’s ideas imply that even if the
course of technology were entirely deterministic, we still could not
predict its future. The same is true for institutions. Some institutions are
conducive to technological change, such as choice in education, free labor
markets, well-enforced property rights, intellectual tolerance, and politi-
cal pluralism. Others are clearly detrimental, such as uncertain property
rights, strong conservative labor unions, totalitarian government, and
excessive conformism and deference to the achievements of past gener-
ations. Most have ambiguous effects, such as patent systems, religion, and
democratic government. What is certain is that technology depends for its
development on what is happening to institutions. If we cannot predict
the one, we cannot predict the other.
One example of the coevolution of institutions and technology is
especially relevant. I have repeatedly maintained that the success of
technological progress depended not only on the marketplace and
complementarities but also on the continuous struggle between those
who want technological change and those who, for one reason or another,116 Joel Mokyr
do not (Mokyr 1994). Inventions often encounter resistance, either from
entrenched interests who stand to lose from the new tecku~ique or think
they will, or from groups and individuals who, for one reason or another,
do not approve of the invention. This is a source of uncertainty that
Rosenberg does not mention, but not one to be glossed over. From the
hapless Roman glassmaker who, according to Tacitus, claimed to have
invented unbreakable glass and was assassinated for his troubles by the
evil Emperor Tiberius, to a m6dern bioengineering company that has to
cope with the likes of Jeremy Rifkin, animal rights advocates, and greedy
lawyers anxious to skim off rents through product liability suits, innova-
tors have had to deal with Luddites in all forms and shapes.
In addition, then, to the normal questions an inventor asks himself
such as "Will it work?" and "Will I be the first one?" are the questions
"What will my neighbors say?"and "Will the FDA approve it?" and
"Could somebody sue me for product liability?" In some cases, such as
the French inventor of the sewing machine, Barth~lemy Thimonnier, and
the English inventor of the flying shuttle, John Kay, the neighbors were
unhappy to the point of burning down their workshops and forcing them
into flight. Precisely because such resistance always takes the form of
non-market mechanisms, the evolution of institutions friendly to new
technology is crucial. It is this coevolution that is responsible for the
relatively short duration, of periods of rapid technological development.
While technological and institutional development often aid and abet
each other, leading to rapid technological change, institutions soon
change and bring the process to a halt.
Rosenberg’s policy recommendation, which is a call to "Let a
hundred flowers bloom," seems to me very much in the traditions of
evolutionary thinking, even if he does not acknowledge this: The process
of innovation, he concludes wistfully, is inevitably inefficient and waste-
ful because of uncertainty. Yet this seems to me to miss the point that all
evolutionary creativity is by necessity incredibly wasteful: Think of all the
millions of mutations that go to waste before one is fixed. Think of the
species that have gone extinct over the past 600 millions of years of
multicellular life. In technological change, we may not even want to call
this "wasteful" since the process itself cannot be made efficient. If it were,
it w~uld lose much or all of its creativity. Uncertainty is neither the cause
of this inefficiency nor its effect. Rather, both are the results of the
evolutionary dynamic at work here.
This coevolutionary dynamic is especially important if we are to
understand the following sentences of Rosenberg’s: "The existence and
refinement of complementary technologies may exercise a coercive and
conservative effect, forcing the novel technology to be placed inside the
current ’system.’ Alternatively, however, complementary technologies
may be exactly what is necessary for the practical realization of an
entirely new system." This seems to link in neatly with the currentDISCUSSION 117
thinking on the dynamic behavior of evolutionary systems that are at the
edge of chaos, to use Murray Gell-Mann’s phrase (1994). They are neither
in the purely conservative area in which all change is immediately
absorbed in the existing system and any innovation is immediately frozen
and absorbed in local equilibria, nor in the chaotic region in which minor
change immediately causes a total disruption of everything and in which
nothing ever returns to a predictable state. Instead, in this region of
self-organizing complexity exist a finite number of equilibria in which the
system can settle down, and while we cannot predict which one will be
chosen, the choice is not totally random.
This is the kind of behavior that "new evolutionists" like Stuart
Kauffman (1995) are trying to bring to bear on evolution. Economic
history should take notice. Technological change may be one of these
"supracritical" processes in history. For thousands of years, technological
change occurred in a variety of societies, always to run out of steam and
see the economy revert back to a steady state. The Industrial Revolution
meant that all of a sudden technological change became the norm rather
than the exception. At that stage, as Kauffman puts it, technology moved
into the supracritical region, and "all bets are off." This is a pithy way of
summarizing Rosenberg’s main point.
OPTIMALITY AND ADAPTATION
Finally, a debate among evolutionary biologists is highly relevant to
Rosenberg’s paper here, because it is mirrored in debates among social
scientists interested in technological change. This is the debate between
adaptationists and anti-adaptationists. The former basically maintain that
evolution gets it right and that every trait that survives the harsh filters of
natural selection has a purpose and a function. This is not quite
equivalent to the "Panglossian" view that everything evolves into an
optimum optimorum, but it does mean that there are no outcomes that
are obvious and persistent errors. Gould and Lewontin’s classic "Span-
drels of San Marco" paper (1979) was a frontal assault on the "adapta-
tionist program," as they called it.
In economic history we have similar debates: On the one hand
we have Paul David (1986), Brian Arthur (1989), and others pointing to
classic cases of lock-in as a result of path dependence, coordination
failures, and externalities; on the other hand we have the standard
neoclassical approach that maintains that if you observe a highly ineffi-
cient outcome such as the Qwerty keyboard you have not looked hard
enough or you are overestimating the degree of inefficiency, as Liebowitz
and Margolis (1990) have argued. The neoclassical view would not rule
out contingency altogether, but it would confine it to more or less
equivalent outcomes and deny that in the long run, chance and history
could lead to persistent inefficient outcomes. If the internal combustion118 Joel Mokyr
engine beat out electrical and steam cars, this view suggests, it is because
it simply was better.
Rather than take a position on this debate--and Rosenberg must
speak for himself--I think it is important to emphasize how and why
technology here differs from living beings. A species that finds itself
in drastically less favorable circumstances has to adapt in some way or it
is likely to go extinct. It can adjust only if some members of the species
have the genetic information that contains the raw materials necessary to
adapt. If this is not the case, extinction is likely. In technological choice,
adaptation is less constrained, since societies can adopt a completely
different technology wholesale--at a cost. These costs are both private
and social, involving at times quite radical adaptation. Think of societies
that after millennia of use have to abandon the camel and the oxen and
get used to the jeep and the tractor. What is interesting in this context is
to investigate whether the private capturable benefits are sufficient to
cover the costs. Without that, there may be another role for the govern-
ment, but it is unclear whether the political environment will produce
this correction. That, too, is a source of uncertainty.
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Luc L.G. Soete*
As one has come to expect when reading Nathan Rosenberg’s papers
and books, his detailed analysis of the history of new technologies
provides invaluable insights into the surprising ways the inventors
themselves originally thought these innovations would affect particular
activities. It is as if the level of inventors’ creativity were somehow
inversely related to their level of imagination with respect to possible
applications of their inventions. In other words, a future remains for us
economists and other creative social scientists!
Through the many cases detailed in Rosenberg’s paper, one gets
a strong impression of the predominance of widespread uncertainty in
technological change. Five dimensions of uncertainty are emphasized:
1) the inherent difficulty of identifying uses for a new technology,
given the often primitive condition in which it first appears;
2) the crucial dependence on improvements through complemen-
tary inventions, often in sectors where potential users are to be found;
3) the systemic features of such complementary improvements
when society is confronted with entirely new technological systems;
4) the inventor’s tendency to aim new technology at a narrow
problem-solving task, thereby foreclosing possible applications in other,
unanticipated contexts; and
5) the need for technological novelty to pass the test of cost-
effectiveness: the economic test.
The author concludes, "New technologies are unrealized potentials
that may take a very large number of eventual shapes." Hence, he
*Professor of International Economics, University of Limburg, the Netherlands, and
Director of the Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology.120 Luc L.G. Soete
strongly argues, governments should refrain from promoting any one
technological alternative (the example of nuclear energy is given) or
focusing on specific research support (he cites the example of the "War
on Cancer"). Rather, "government policy ought to open many windows
and provide the private sector with financial incentives to explore the
technological landscape that can only be faintly discerned from those
windows."
I am of course impressed with the variety of cases described by the
author. While Rosenberg admits in his typical understated way that
the evidence presented is "anecdotal," he nevertheless claims that the
anecdotes have been so selected as to include many of the most important
innovations of the twentieth century. I am, with my limited knowledge,
tempted to agree, but first I would like to see a more rigorous and
complete description of what could be reasonably called "major" (at what
time, though, and on what basis?) new technologies over the past two
centuries. Could it not be that precisely because of their unanticipated
impacts, one tends to focus on just those technologies that turned out to
have economic and social impacts so unexpected that they aroused the
interest of historians? In other words, is the anecdotal evidence indeed
just "anecdotal," that is, of little general value?
Second, is there not much more to be said about some kinds of
sectoral or technological uncertainty associated with research? Surely, the
uncertainties in new drug research are of a different nature from the
uncertainties in designing a next generation of chips. In the first case, a
much larger degree of uncertainty seems to be linked to the often "trial
and error" nature of the research involved; in the second case, the
research often appears to be progressing along a relatively straightfor-
ward engineering trajectory--with attempts at miniaturization, say, or
use of alternative materials (see, for example, Moore’s Law). Would it not
then be reasonable to assume that the uncertainties in the latter case are
much less uncertain, and much more the type detailed by experts in the
field, like Robert Howe of IBM with respect to the future intelligent
assistant, the potential impact of electronic networking on banking, and
the commodification of financial services?
Third, and as indicated in the introduction to this session, is there not
also 6vidence that these uncertainties might be different over time and
might even display some cyclical characteristics, depending on the
particular phase of the economy? Beginning some 15 years ago, Rosen-
berg and I have both taken part in a long-standing discussion with a
German colleague, Gerhard Mensch, about the possible "clustering" of
major new technologies in periods of depression (the Mensch claim) or
recovery (our claim). Again, I would argue that beyond the particular
long-term aspects of that debate, it has some significant features that
could shed light on the way the aggregate performance of the economy
might influence technological risks and uncertainties.DISCUSSION 121
Let me elaborate somewhat on this point, in light of the paper by
Dale Jorgenson as well. The "productivity paradox," highlighted in
Rosenberg’s paper, is illustrated for the G-7 countries in Figures 1 and 2
in a very approximate way. Productivity growth fell steadily in the G-7
countries over the past 30 years to about half the level of the late 1960s.
(Productivity growth is measured in Figure 1 as GDP per man-hour for
the aggregate G-7 and smoothed over 11-year averages; an even more
rapidly declining picture would be obtained using growth in Total Factor
Productivity.) This decline in productivity growth contrasts sharply with
the increase in business expenditures on research and development over
the 1970s and 1980s, as illustrated in Figure 2. It also contrasts sharply
with the increase in the share of total private R&D funding in most OECD
countries, which has also risen steeply over the same period.
In explaining this paradox, Nathan Rosenberg, along with many
others including myself, emphasizes the numerous uncertainties and
difficulties involved in identifying the efficient use of a set of relatively
pervasive technologies, such as information and communication technol-
ogies. And again, while I am very sympathetic to this view and the
optimism it gives rise to--"You ain’t seen nothin’ yet: The future is still
going to bring us the major benefits of these new technologies!"--
alternative explanations are possible, two of which I would like to
highlight here.
The first one focuses on aggregate measurement issues and the
likelihood that, increasingly, we are mismeasuring output in a large
number of information goods and services. This explanation has been
raised by many authors, and I will not elaborate on it here (for more
detail, see Soete 1996). I would just insist, as has Nakamura (1995), that
our failure to include "consumer surplus" in real output measures is
likely to have led us to greatly underestimate output growth, by much
more than we may have corrected through the use of techniques like
hedonic pricing. My guesstimate is that Nakamura, with his assessment
of a 2 to 3 percent per year overestimation of inflation, is probably nearer
the mark than the Boskin report.1 My own back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion for Europe would suggest that 2 to 3 percent is a reasonable estimate
of the overestimation bias there as well.
The second explanation focuses on the interaction between short-
term macroeconomic policies and long-term incentives for investment in
research and development, possibly the core question at this con-
ference. The crucial question is whether one unexpected side effect of the
monetary policies of the 1980s, which were aimed at reducing inflation,
1 "Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living." Interim Report to the
Senate Finance Committee from the Advisory Committee to Study the Consumer Price
Index, September 15, 1995.122 Luc L.G. Soete
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has been a significant shift in the nature of research and development. In
the 1980s and 1990s, real long-term interest rates turned positive and
became, in the postwar context, extremely high. Among other things, the
rise signaled the burden on capital markets posed by excessive govern-
bent deficits in some of the major OECD countries, as well as by the
growing capital needs of an expanding group of newly industrializing
countries. As is illustrated in Figure 3, the 1980s were also a period of
"crowding-in" of private R&D investment.
My claim would be that the short-term monetary policies of the 1980s
led to a focus on short-term R&D, with a much stronger emphasis on
product differentiation and relatively immediate private returns. In other
words, short-term monetary policies could well have resulted in a
pernicious decline in long-term potential growth, as high real interest
rates shifted private firms’ investment incentives to research of an
immediate, short-term nature at the expense of longer-term, more uncer-
tain efforts.
High real interest rates lead to an intensified focus on the present.
Hence, more long-term, risky, and uncertain activities will often be
eliminated from the research portfolio. Indirect evidence for such a trend,
I would claim, can be found in the business literature on R&D and124 Luc L.G. Soete
innovation management. This literature describes, in quite some detail,
how R&D activities in many firms gradually became "streamlined" into
business units’ R&D centers. Strategic, "free" R&D had to become
increasingly "legitimized" and was dramatically reduced over a very
short period. As has been highlighted in consultancy reports, many large
firms cut their strategic independent R&D dramatically: Hoechst, for
example, from 75 percent to 25 percent of total R&D.
The result has been, as emphasized by authors in the innovation
management area, that the R&D manager has become much more
directly controlled by business unit managers, who are more aware of the
immediate pressures for results. As Arnold (1992) put it: "Being close to
the customer encourages incremental development and rarely inspires
breakthroughs, simply because customers tend to have an evolutionary
view of their need and rarely support a visionary spark." Similarly, a
recent Arthur D. Little survey of European R&D managers points to the
way "R&D functions are going through a quiet revolution, driven by
intensifying competition and shorter product life cycles. They are becom-
ing more closely linked to other parts of the business; researchers are
becoming more aware of business economics and the needs of consum-
ers." As one manager put it: "We have short-term profit and loss
pressures which do not allow us to focus on long-term visions."2 This
case evidence fits well the aggregate trend and the resulting shift in the
nature of R&D, described above.
To conclude, let me question the relevance of some of the historical
analogies in this area. Can we really say, with anything more than faith,
that as it took 40 years for electricity to produce efficiency benefits, the
same must be true for current information and communication technol-
ogies? Surely the world has changed a great deal, and the technologies
are by and large not comparable in their impact. The price decline linked
to information processing reportedly already exceeds by a full percentage
point the limited price effects of electricity. As Triplett (1994) has pointed
out in a critique of an historical analogy made by Paul David (1990)
between the computer and the dynamo, any simple diffusion model
would tell you that the rate of diffusion of computer technology should be
much more rapid than that of the dynamo. In other words, as time passes,
productivity growth remains low; yet we are witnessing the introduction
of ever more powerful information and communication equipment all
around us, while technologists, economists, bankers, and policymakers
herald the benefits of these new technologies. I am becoming more and
more suspicious of explanations predicting the likely benefits to come on
the basis of historical analogy. The future is not what it used to be, still
less what historians today believe the past was like.
See further Houlder, V. "Quiet Revolution." Financial Times, March 26, 1996, p. 10.DISCUSSION 125
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